


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# IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

HISTORICAL &  
STATISTICAL  
SUMMARY

1 JANUARY 1943 - 1 JUNE 1943





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12830



BRIGADIER GENERAL  
WILLIAM L. RICHARDSON  
COMMANDING GENERAL

BRIGADE AND WING COMMANDERS

71 <sup>ST</sup>	FIGHTER WING	—	BRIG. GEN. NED SCHRAMM
31 <sup>ST</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	BRIG. GEN. WILLIS MCD CHAPIN
47 <sup>TH</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	COLONEL CHARLES R. FINLEY
50 <sup>TH</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	BRIG. GEN. CLARE H. ARMSTRONG
51 <sup>ST</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	BRIG. GEN. CHARLES C. CURTIS
52 <sup>ND</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	BRIG. GEN. NATHANIEL A. BURNELL
54 <sup>TH</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	BRIG. GEN. DANIEL W. HICKEY, JR.
56 <sup>TH</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	BRIG. GEN. GEORGE M. BADGER
74 <sup>TH</sup>	AAA BRIGADE	—	BRIG. GEN. HARRY F. MEYERS

# FORWARD...

HEADQUARTERS  
IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND  
Office of the Commanding General

The IX Air Defense Command was conceived in the early weeks of 1944 as that part of the Ninth Air Force to be responsible for the defense, against enemy air attack, of all areas (except the forward ground combat zone) vital to U.S. forces during Operation OVERLORD - the invasion of the Continent from the West. The Command was born on 30 March 1944, and operated in the performance of the above mission in England, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and Germany until after V-E Day, 8 May 1945. The mission was accomplished - no vital area defended by the IX Air Defense Command suffered more than minor damage from what was once the greatest air force in the world.

This Command represents the only successful attempt in World War II to implement the doctrine and effect the technique of coordinated air defense, as laid down in the War Department field manuals. The integration of air, antiaircraft, and signal elements into a unified team was not, however, accomplished without considerable opposition and difficulty. The doctrine proved sound, but the technique had to be modified in some respects to fit the mobile and expanding situation existing during an offensive campaign on a grand scale.

The AAA component of the Command was large and important (at peak operations 50 battalions in 8 brigades), but the IX Air Defense Command was not simply an antiaircraft artillery command. During the early months of the campaign, 4 American and British night fighter squadrons, 2 signal air warning battalions, and 3 fighter control squadrons operated under the Command, and a Group of P-51s was earmarked to join. In the fall of 1944, however, the deterioration of the Luftwaffe permitted the diversion of all fighters of offensive roles, and the entrusting of all air defense primarily to Antiaircraft Artillery.

Nor were the responsibilities of the Command confined to air defense, as has been supposed by some. Although the 50 odd air defense units required for the operation of the Ninth Air Force were always a major concern of the IX Air Defense Command, so also were the ports, depot areas, and communications centers such as CMAA and Utah Beaches, Cherbourg, Marsailles, Le Havre, Paris, Antwerp, Reims, Verdun, Liege, Charleroi, the Rhine River crossings, and a host of other vital points.

This Summary presents, in as concise a manner as possible, some of the more important and interesting facts and figures pertaining to the organization and operation of the IX Air Defense Command.

*William L. Richardson*  
WILLIAM L. RICHARDSON  
Brigadier General U.S. Army  
Commanding

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


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# A COMBINED EFFORT



**AIR - SIGNAL - AAA**

# NARRATIVE

In the fall of 1943, the planning staff of the Ninth Air Force, motivated by a desire to keep the fighters of the Tactical Air Commands concentrated on offensive missions and free of any defense responsibilities, determined to establish an Air Defense Command to protect the bases and lines of communication of the Air, Ground and Service Forces taking part in the great European invasion. This Command would organize and operate a coordinated air defense composed of the three vital elements: day and night fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and an aircraft warning and fighter control service.


Brigadier General William L. Richardson was then directing combined training activities of antiaircraft units and air force units in the Fourth Air Force on the west coast of the United States. His services were requested by the Ninth Air Force to organize the new Command, and he arrived in London on 27 December 1943. An initial air defense plan was quickly but carefully drawn up and the task of organizing, training, and equipping the Command was begun.

Early in January 1944, the 52d AAA Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General N. A. Burnell II, and the 118th AAA Group, commanded by Colonel James E. Campbell, arrived in England and were assigned to the Ninth Air Force installations. Personnel of these two organizations were utilized, on a temporary basis, to operate the IX Air Defense Command Headquarters until such time as permanently assigned personnel could take over; the integrity of the two units, however, was maintained and their personnel later released from the command headquarters for operational missions. In February and March, as more antiaircraft units began to arrive in the United Kingdom, a number were attached to the Ninth

Air Force and utilized to defend operational airdromes, and also to engage in combined training with air force units. The policy of making one AAA Brigade available to each of the major flying Commands of the Ninth Air Force was established and tested. The purpose of this policy was to form an air-antiaircraft team upon which the commander could depend for the continued air defense of his installations regardless of their movement.

Under this system the activities of all the antiaircraft units serving with a particular Command were coordinated by the brigade commander, who established his headquarters near the air commander and who became his advisor on antiaircraft matters. This plan was inaugurated when the 51st AAA Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Charles C. Curtis, was ordered to Middle Wallop, England, to work with the XIX Tactical Air Command, and the 52d AAA Brigade, commanded by General Burnell, was teamed with the IX Tactical Air Command. Practical experience soon proved that the idea was sound; it made for an unprecedented degree of team-work and cooperation between air units and the antiaircraft units defending them, and it provided a continuity of defense which hitherto had never been achieved. This policy proved so successful that it has been adopted as a standing operating procedure within the Ninth Air Force.

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, IX Air Defense Command, with an authorized strength of 118 officers and 253 enlisted men, was formally activated on 30 March 1944 as one of the major Commands of the Ninth Air Force. In the meantime two air warning battalions had been assigned to the command and the first night fighter squadrons, equipped with P-61 Black Widow airplanes, were arriving in



General Richardson and His Staff — PARIS FRANCE



the Theater and were beginning to undergo operational training. A tactical training area was established in which the three components of an air defense system could receive final combined training under conditions approximating those likely to be encountered later on the Continent. To accomplish this training an area of about 20,000 square miles on the east coast of England lying between the TYNE and HUMBER Rivers was selected, and the air warning battalions ordered to proceed there from home stations by tactical marches, deployed and provided early warning for vital installations within the area. Control was exercised through a combined operations center established near NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE, and soon P-61 aircraft were available to fly intercept missions using ground-controlled interception techniques made possible with data from the radars of the air warning units. As training progressed, team-work increased on the part of all concerned and it was not unusual to make twenty or more successful interceptions in a single night. The P-61 squadrons were eventually moved to SCORTON, a Royal Air Force Station, and were based there until their final movement to the Continent.

While practical experience was being gained by the tactical units in the field, the Command Headquarters in London was preparing for operations on the Continent when the invasion should take place. Plans for the invasion involved coordination of this Command's activities with those of other Ninth Air Force major commands, with the Field Armies, and with the Royal Air Force. Since the American night fighter resources were not considered adequate to meet the initial requirements for Operations "OVERLORD", it was determined that the IX Air Defense Command would be reinforced with British elements to be supplied by 85 Group, Royal Air Force. This group was then operating as a part of the Air Defense of Great Britain, and had acquired considerable exper-

ience in combatting the German bomber force.

The initial missions of the IX Air Defense Command in Operation "OVERLORD" were as follows:

1. With assistance of RAF 85 Group, to control and operate night fighters in the American Sector.

2. To follow up and relieve the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands, supporting the First and Third U S Armies respectively, of responsibility for daylight interception of enemy air attacks as these Commands displaced forward.

3. In accordance with the provisions of Operations Memorandum Number 7, SHAEF, to exercise operational control over all antiaircraft artillery in those areas in which it had assumed responsibility.

4. To make available air raid intelligence to Passive Air Defense Control Centers.

5. To supervise, coordinate, and perform aircraft movement liaison functions for the entire Ninth Air Force.

6. To command all antiaircraft artillery units assigned or attached to the Ninth Air Force and to supervise all airdrome defense activities within the Ninth Air Force.

As D-Day approached, air units then operating with the IX Tactical Air Command were earmarked for future assignment to the IX Air Defense Command. The 71st Fighter Wing, commanded by Brigadier General Ned Schramm, joined and took over supervision of the night fighter squadrons and fighter control activities of the command. Meanwhile the antiaircraft units attached to the command were being moved to the marshalling areas and were progressively released from their attachment, since the Field Armies were to assume responsibility for their employment until such time as the initial beachhead was large enough to permit the establishment of a Communications Zone behind them.

When the first V-1 flying bomb attacks on England developed on the night of 13 June



90mm gun and crew

1944, units of the IX Air Defense Command were in position to deliver effective fire against them. The 491st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion attached to 51st AAA Brigade was the first Battalion to shoot down a buzz bomb. The 21st AAA Group and units attached thereto, firing from positions in Kent, destroyed ten flying bombs during the first eleven hours of the initial attack. AAA units of the command continued to attack flying bombs with remarkable success during the first few weeks of the invasion. The flying bomb attacks also presented an opportunity for the night fighter

squadrons to round out their operational training.

On D-Day (6 June 1944) elements of the Command Headquarters and 85 Group landed just after the initial assault waves and proceeded to reconnoiter and establish a GCI radar station. Squadrons of 85 Group, flying from bases in the United Kingdom, operated night fighters over the beachhead at first under control of stations in England—later under local control. These patrols were flown by Mosquito aircraft and later by American P-61's. The joint American and British resources were

used in the closest cooperation and with maximum effect during this period.


Advanced Headquarters, IX Air Defense Command, was established on the Continent at Ecrammeville, France, on 27 June 1944.

On 26 July, the Commanding General, IX Air Defense Command, assumed responsibility for the night defense of the CHERBOURG Peninsula. To execute this responsibility 21 Sector of 85 Group, having already established control stations on the Continent, began to move its squadrons there. The American night fighter squadrons continued to operate from

the United Kingdom in conjunction with the RAF squadrons.

The 422nd and 425th Night Fighter Squadrons were now ready for full-scale operations on the Continent. The 1st and 2nd Air Defense Wings (Provisional) were preparing to take over designated areas for air defense responsibility as soon as the Field Forces broke out of the bridgehead. By the end of July the bridgehead was enlarged and an all-American night fighter defense was centered at RENNES, where the 1st Air Defense Wing (Provisional) commenced active operations. From this time on

**M-51 quad-50 Cal. Machine Gun emplaced on Ninth Air Force airfield. P-47 fighter aircraft may be seen beyond sight.**







IX Air Defense Command artist's conception of 40mm gun engaging a V-1 "buzz-bomb" in the defense of port of Antwerp. Original sketch was made at gun site.

until the German Air Force was so reduced that the tactical situation no longer warranted active night fighter defense of the rear areas, the two Air Defense Wings with their associated night fighter squadrons and control elements continued to provide effective air defense of the American Sector. 85 Group units were gradually released as American units took over the entire defense responsibility.

Night sorties of the German Air Force had, by the middle of August, decreased to such an extent that it was no longer necessary to maintain complete night fighter coverage. Instead, a "front" was established with fighter and fighter control elements disposed well forward to prevent any penetration of the rear areas.

A change in the antiaircraft situation took place on 26 July when SHAEF decided that the Ninth Air Force thenceforth would have exclusive responsibility for the coordinated air defense of all American areas on the Continent lying behind the rear boundaries of the Field Armies. All antiaircraft artillery units not assigned to the armies were attached to the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe for further attachment to the Ninth Air Force and to the IX Air Defense Command, which was designated the agency responsible for all air defense activities in the Communications Zone. It was agreed that attachment of these antiaircraft units to the IX Air Defense Command included all the prerogatives of command, supply, and administration. This change in basic policy enabled the Ninth Air Force through its agency, the IX Air Defense Command, to control all the elements vital to the establishment of an air defense system as contemplated under existing War Department doctrines. As a result of the new policy, the strength of the IX Air Defense Command was increased enormously; however, since all planning had been based on the assumption that the command would either exercise operational control or actual command over all antiaircraft units in

the rear areas, no major organizational changes were necessary. When antiaircraft units were attached to the IX Air Defense Command in August, the command was able to proceed with the establishment of a unified air defense system in the then rapidly expanding area of liberated France.

As more territory was acquired the scope of the operations of the IX Air Defense Command was increased accordingly. The general policy followed in these operations was to provide concentrated antiaircraft defenses at especially vital or vulnerable points and to establish a general area defense with night fighters. As the area to be defended increased in size and enemy night activity decreased, fighter dispositions were changed to provide a screen through which any attacking formations would have to fly before reaching vulnerable points. Antiaircraft units in sufficient density to provide effective protection were concentrated at vital points in accordance with priorities established by Communications Zone.

On 6 September, the Command Headquarters moved from RENNES to VERSAILLES and began to take up new problems. The unprecedented advances of the Field Armies during August and September created an acute shortage of motor transportation within the Theater and the IX Air Defense Command formed ten provisional truck companies, described in the section entitled "IX ADC Truck Companies."

As the field Armies moved farther into enemy territory and the German Air operations became increasingly defensive, the danger of air attack on Communications Zone installations lessened. By October the air situation had become such that air defense could be intrusted to AAA alone, thus releasing the night fighters for intruder operations. The two night fighter squadrons were relieved from assignment to the IX Air Defense Command and assigned to the Tactical Air Commands, together with two of the three signal aircraft warning battalions.



**Fortified field kitchen on an advanced fighter airfield.**

The 71st Fighter Wing was released to provide the nucleus of the new 1st Tactical Air Force (Provisional). The primary elements of the defenses were now the antiaircraft units of the Command, and the aid of fighters of the Tactical Air Commands was to be furnished when requested.

During October German intentions with respect to flying bomb and rocket attacks on ANTWERP and LIEGE had been the subject of careful study and analysis. On 17 October orders were issued by SHAEF to deploy IX Air Defense Command units in defense of Antwerp and movement of units to the area began at once. Under the 50th AAA Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Clare H. Armstrong, a strong defensive belt was established across the line of approach of the flying bombs. Since Antwerp was situated in the British Sector, the IX Air Defense Command units deployed there were placed under the operational command of the British 21 Army Group; however, training, supply, and administration of these units remained a IX Air Defense Command responsibility.

Early in December, the Command A-2 estimated that a resumption of German air activity was imminent. Accordingly, a warning was

disseminated to all units, higher, lower and parallel. The date of the warning was 7 December 1944, and a resumption of activity was predicted for a period two weeks later. Preparations were made by the command to meet the expected attacks. These included an increase in the state of readiness and the filling out of defenses in the more forward areas.

The anticipated attacks occurred and were highly unsuccessful. One Brigade submitted claims for 60 aircraft destroyed or probably destroyed.

During the early part of the German Ardennes counter-offensive, the 863d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion, temporarily attached to the First Army, performed a classic in combined air and ground defense, on one occasion actually constituting a portion of the front line. This Battalion later received the Distinguished Unit Citation for its splendid performance.

The first tactical operation of the new year was the destruction of a JU 88 at 010040 January 1945 by Battery C, 414th AAA Gun Battalion, while participating in the battle of the "Bulge". Another of the outstanding New Year's Day operations was the early morning attack on an airfield near Metz by twenty-five (25) ME 109's. During this attack Batteries "A" and "C" of the 386th AAA Automatic Wea-

**90mm gun at USTAF Exhibition at Paris**





**Brigadier General Charles C. Curtis of 51st AAA Brigade inspecting heavy barreled cal. 50 machine gun on improvised AA mount.**

pons Battalion with batteries of the 411th AAA Gun Battalion and the 465th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion, the latter two Third Army units, destroyed 14 and damaged four more of the attacking planes. Two batteries of the 386th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion received credit for destroying eight (8) and da-

maging three (3) of the totals just mentioned. For this accomplishment they received a letter of commendation from Lieutenant General GEORGE S. PATTON, Commanding General, Third U.S. Army. At the time the 386th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion was attached to the 51st AAA Brigade.



The tempo of German "Diver" activity was appreciably stepped up during the month of January. Continuous and intense "Diver" raids were encountered by the IX Air Defense Command units in the Antwerp area attached to the 50th AAA Brigade. Confirmed claims for the month included two hundred (200) "Divers" and thirty-six (36) standard enemy aircraft shot down or destroyed by units of this command.

On 19 January, in order to establish and maintain a more appropriate division of responsibility for antiaircraft protection between forward and rear areas, the Supreme Commander directed the use of an "Army Group Rear Air Boundary" to be drawn by the Army Group Commander in accordance with his forward area requirements for antiaircraft protection. The responsibility for antiaircraft protection in rear of this line devolved upon the Air Defense Command and forward of this line upon the Army Group. The establishment of this line, by agreement between the Army Group and Air Defense Commanders, obviated the shifting of units between the Army Group and Air Defense Command, and divorced air defense from ground administrative boundaries.

On 18 April 1945, Detachment "B", Headquarters, IX Air Defense Command, opened at

#### WIESBADEN, GERMANY.

By 22 April 1945 the GAF was so impotent that a token defense only was required for vital areas west of the Rhine. Most of the units of the command were on Rhine river crossings and airfields to the east of the Rhine.

In addition to AA defense, units on the Rhine bridges were charged with the ground defense and local security of those sites. This secondary role was accomplished by coordination with the Fifteenth Army on the left bank of the Rhine river, and the First, Third, and Ninth Armies on the right bank.


With the decrease in AAA requirements, units were diverted to other endeavors. Six (6) AAA Gun Battalions and two (2) AAA Groups were attached to IX AFSC for disarmament work. Nine (9) AAA Gun Battalions and four (4) AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions were relieved of assignment of this command to perform PW duty.

With the cessation of hostilities on 8 May 1945, all units were concentrated on airdromes in GERMANY, to perform a security mission and await redeployment.

On 21 May 1945, Headquarters, IX Air Defense Command, opened at BAD NEUSTADT, GERMANY, its permanent location as part of the United States Air Forces in Europe.

# HEADQUARTERS IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

## ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



8 MAY 1945






























# AWARDS AND DECORATIONS




FROM 1 JAN. 1944

	UNIT CITATION	2
	SOLDIERS MEDAL	89
	OAK LEAF CLUSTER	1
	POSTHUMOUS	2
	BRONZE STAR	844
	OAK LEAF CLUSTER	4
	POSTHUMOUS	2
	LEGION OF MERIT	8
	OAK LEAF CLUSTER	2
	PURPLE HEART	21
	OAK LEAF CLUSTER	1
	AIR MEDAL	67
	OAK LEAF CLUSTER	6
	FRENCH CROIX DE GUERRE	129
	LUXEMBOURG CROIX DE GUERRE	3
	BELGIUM CROIX DE GUERRE	187
	MERITORIOUS SERVICE UNIT STAR	1
	MERITORIOUS SERVICE UNIT PLAQUE	6









VITAL AREAS DEFENDED  
AND DISPOSITION OF UNITS  
IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND  
8 MAY 1945


LEGEND

- |              |   |              |   |
|--------------|---|--------------|---|
| 32 AIRFIELDS | ○ | 22 BRIDGES   | ⊙ |
| 4 PORTS      | ● | 3 CITIES     | + |
| 3 TANK PARKS | ⊕ | 1 IX AF DUMP | ⊠ |



# NUMBER AND TYPE AAA UNITS IN IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND 1944-1945







## FINAL CLAIMS OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT BY IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND UNITS

	JU 88.	JU 188	FW 190	ME 109	ME 110	ME 210	ME 262	HE 111	HE 177	DO 217	MISC	TOTAL CLAIMS
422-425NF Sqs	5-2				3-0				1-0			9-2
113 GUN BN	1½-1				1-0						1½-6	4-7
118 GUN BN											2-4	2-4
125 GUN BN	1-0											1-0
126 GUN BN	0-1		½-0								5-1	5½-2
143 GUN BN				1-0							0-2	1-2
184 GUN BN	4½-0		1-0	2-0						1-0	2-8	10½-8
204 AW BN	2-0											2-0
225 SLT BN	1-0											1-0
385 AW BN	0-1		1-0	3-0								4-1
386 AW BN				8½-2	0-1	0-1						8½-4
397 AW BN			1-0									1-0
405 GUN BN				1-0		1-0						2-0
407 GUN BN						1-0						1-0
414 GUN BN	3-0										4-0	7-0
451 AW BN	½-2		½-1	0-1	½-0	0-1					0-1	1½-6
481 AW BN	0-1											0-1
494 GUN BN				2-2							0-2	2-4
495 GUN BN				0-1½							4-6	4-7½
564 AW BN								1-0				1-0
566 AW BN								1-0				1-0
601 GUN BN											4-3	4-3
602 GUN BN	1-0		½-0	5½-2							5-2	12-4
605 GUN BN	1-0										1-0	2-0
740 GUN BN	2-0			0-½							1-5½	3-6
776 AW BN	1-0					½-0					1-0	2½-0
784 AW BN	0-1		3-1	4-1	½-0							7½-3
787 AW BN	4-1											4-1
788 AW BN	2-2		2½-0	4-9		0-1	0-2					8½-14
789 AW BN	0-1		3½-1	3½-0								7-2
792 AW BN		⅓-0	1-1								1-0	2⅓-1
795 AW BN			1-0									1-0
863 AW BN	0-1		4½-2	1½-2								6-5
TOTAL CONFIRMED CLAIMS	29½-14	⅓-0	20-6	35⅝-21	5-1	2½-3	0-2	2-0	1-0	1-0	3½-40½	

TOTAL: CAT I = 128½ ■ CAT II = 87½



## Story of ANTWERP "X"

History records many outstanding and heroic feats and accomplishments during this war, yet there are some operations which have not received the attention and credit that they deserve. Among these is listed Antwerp "X". Antwerp "X" was a special and a secret AAA Command created in October 1944 to combat with AAA alone the flying bombs then directed against the victory port of Antwerp.

Perhaps it is more apropos to sketch a background for the creation of Antwerp "X". In the fall of 1944, the Allied Forces after their brilliant drive across France found themselves exceeding the physical limits of the supply services using ports and beaches in Normandy as points of entry. By a stroke of fortune, the Allies in their capture of Antwerp, the third largest port in the world, won a supply base hundreds of miles nearer the front lines than the ports in Normandy. Antwerp was taken after a spectacular drive by Marshall Montgomery's Armies which moved 110 miles in 8 hours, and also by the efforts of the Belgian re-

sistance movement in Antwerp. Despite the fact that this port was captured almost intact, with hundreds of cranes and large quantities of port machinery, it was not usable because its approaches were held by the Germans. The enemy fully cognizant of the strategic significance of Antwerp, held tenaciously to these approaches. In the early part of October allied intelligence indicated enemy movements and preparations for V-1 launchings direct at Antwerp. Some experimental V-1's fell short of Antwerp in mid October. It did not take long for the Allied high command to undertake measures to combat the V-1 threat to the only large port then in allied hands. At first the 80th AA Brigade (British) was assigned the command of the AA elements in the Antwerp area, but it was soon relieved of this mission when the 30th AAA Group was assigned by IX Air Defense Command to inaugurate the V-1 defense of Antwerp. With it came two AAA Gun Battallions, the 125th and 126th. Evidence of the enemy intent to make an all-out

effort against Antwerp with V-1's and V-2's was becoming clearer daily. As a result, in various parts of France gun and automatic weapons battalions of the IX Air Defense Command were being alerted and directed to Antwerp.

On 22 October 1944, the 56th AAA Brigade under Brigadier General Badger, assumed

arrived at Antwerp and Brigadier General Clare Armstrong, by virtue of seniority, took over the direction of Antwerp "X".

By November 15th, there were 2 brigades, 4 groups, 12 gun battalions and 2 automatic weapons battalions of the IX Air Defense Command engaged in the battle. In addition there was the British 42d AA Searchlight Regiment,



**Members of British 3.7 in. HAA gun demonstrate to American AAA men.**

command of Antwerp "X" from the 30th AAA Group, commanded by Colonel Ralph Russell. On the 24th of October the two initial battalions received their baptism in fire when they engaged flying bombs intended for the Antwerp vital area. Battalions were coming into Antwerp by day and by night. The 45th AAA Group joined Antwerp "X" on October 27th. On November 5th, the 50th AAA Brigade

which had been under Antwerp "X" since October 20th.

In October and November the flying bomb attacks directed at Antwerp came from the southeast, from areas near Bonn. In the first two months of the attack, up to and including November 30th, 546 V-1's passed over the existing AAA defenses. Only 250 were threats to the vital area, however, and of these 119

were destroyed by AAA fire. The need for improvement was obvious. Fortunately the V-1's at this time were quite erratic and none caused military damage of any significance in the Antwerp vital area. However special gunnery instruction teams and various specialist were provided by the IX Air Defense Command to Antwerp "X". More emphasis was placed on superior AAA gunnery. This new target, V-1, which the British scientists considered eight times harder to kill than an ordinary plane, had to be defeated. Early warning and AAAS facilities were increased and improved so that at least several minutes of warning was provided on each of the flying bombs directed against Antwerp.

In December good results were obtained. Of the 467 vital area threats, 273 were destroyed. This indicates a shooting score of over 50 percent, the goal set by the Allied high command. Yet there was room for improvement and this was to be later realized.

The first part of December, after Walcheren Island and the areas on either side of the Scheldt Estuary were won, friendly shipping began to come into port. At the time the enemy

**Crew of 90mm gun perform daily maintenance in between alerts during defense of Antwerp.**



**Typical 40mm AW gun crew, emplaced and alert for V-1's.**

redoubled his efforts, until the 10th of December when an unexpected lull of several days developed. However, that flying bomb effort which might have been expended against Antwerp was directed against the supply centers near Leige, as a prelude to Runstedt's Ardennes offensive in mid-December.

While the battle of the Bulge was raging, the German Luftwaffe was moving the flying bomb launching sights to the northeast of Antwerp. The new attacks began with devastating results because the area wherein troops would have to be deployed to meet it were unrestricted for flying, and firing was permitted at seen targets only. Unseen (radar-controlled) fire was prohibited. The weather at this time was extremely foggy; as a result many flying bombs coming from the northeast which were detected by radar and audible means, could not be engaged. It was not long, however, before a restricted area commensurate with the situation was established.

After the momentum of Runstedt's offensive increased, the need for additional troops arose in our First Army area. Antwerp "X", during



this time, dispatched 1 Group Headquarters, 4 Gun Battalions, and 3 Automatic Weapons Battalions to the first US Army. During this time the northeast attacks were becoming a greater threat than ever, with as many as 52 flying bombs being directed against Antwerp in a 24 hour period. By January 1th there were 7 US Gun Battalions and 1 Automatic Weapons Battalion in position to meet the northeast attacks, while at the same time 5 Gun Battalions were deployed to meet the southeast attacks.

much higher scores than was considered possible prior to this time.

After the complete failure in the Battle of the Bulge, the enemy continued his attacks against Antwerp on an all-out scale. He was determined to deny the movement of supplies and equipment through Antwerp to support the inevitable Allied offensive into Germany. For the month of February, 1,110 of the 1,977 V-1's launched were VA threats. Of these VA threats, which were the only engageable targets, 770 or approximately 70 percent were destroyed.



**90mm gun crew manning posts on the double.**

In the latter part of January a new attack was in store for Antwerp "X". On the 29th, the deadliest of the flying bomb threats came from the north. These were launched just north of the Maas River, approximately 60 miles from Antwerp and therefore from such short distances that the customary several minute early warning of the southeast and northeast attacks became less. On January 30th an extremely heavy effort of 92 flying bombs was made against the port area of Antwerp. However, new equipment was being made available to Antwerp "X" which permitted achievement of

As of March 10th, Antwerp "X" had 1 US and 1 British Gun Battalion, plus 1 Automatic Weapons Battalion, to meet the southeast attacks which were now diminishing in importance. The northeast attacks were being met by 8 US Gun Battalions, 2 British Heavy AA Battalions, and 2 troops of Polish Automatic Weapons Artillery. The northern attacks were faced by 2 US Gun Battalions, two British HAA Battalions, 1 US Automatic Weapons Battalion, and 1 British Automatic Weapons Battalion. The attacks during March continued on a considerably reduced scale. The last attack from





**Two members of 40mm gun crew, "Murder Inc." which shot down 14 V-1's. The 40mm gun was not as effective against the flying bombs as the heavier 90mm.**

the southeast occurred on March 19th; the last northern attack on the 29th, and the last northeast attack on the 30th. During March Antwerp "X" achieved an unprecedented 6-day score of 97.8 percent when 89 out of 91 V-1's were destroyed.

In the 5 month period, over 22,000 men and officers of the British, Polish and American AAA, and associated services, participated in Antwerp "X". During this same period 32 military persons were killed by V-1's and V-2's, and 298 wounded.

The defenses included 208 90mm guns, 128 3.7 guns, 96 American, 60 British, and 32 Polish 40mm Bofors guns. In addition there were 20mm experimental units in small numbers, as well as a great number of M-51 cal. .50 machine guns. Searchlight illumination was provided by 72 searchlights of the 42d British AA Searchlight Regiment.

During the entire campaign, 4,883 flying bombs were detected by the military agencies,

2,759 were accurately aimed at Antwerp, but only 211 hit their target. 1,766 (64%) of the VA threats were killed; 547 Category A and 1,219 Category B. The remainder missed the mark because of range errors or defective mechanisms.

It was reported by authorities at Antwerp that the total military damage to US port installations by V-1's amounted to approximately 10,000 dollars.

Facts and figures quoted above speak of a clear-cut victory over Hitler's vengeance weapon No. 1. In the words of Major General Revell-Smith, 21st Army Group: "This is a great victory; perhaps not heralded or understood by the world at large in the same way as they would appreciate a victory by other arms. The victories of other arms have territorial gains to show. You have not, but nevertheless this does not make it less important than any other form of major military success on the final outcome of the war".




**A fortified SCR 584 at Antwerp**


**Well sand-bagged 90mm gun and height finder  
with crew at their posts.**




# DIVER APPROACHES AND VITAL - AREA THREATS 1944 - 1945




THIS CHART COMPARES THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DIVERS LAUNCHED AGAINST ANTWERP WITH THOSE WHICH WERE THREATS TO THE VITAL AREA.




**LEGEND**



TOTAL ATTACKS- 4883  
TOTAL VA THREATS- 2759



PERCENTAGE OF DIVER KILLS  
TO DIVERS ENGAGED




NUMBER OF DIVERS PER MONTHLY PERIOD WHICH  
LANDED IN THE ANTWERP VITAL AREA TOGETHER  
WITH CUMULATIVE TOTALS.

# ANTWERP X

1944 - 1945

**NOTE:**

CAT A CLAIMS REFER TO DIVERS, ENGAGED BY AA & CAUSED TO EXPLODE IN FLIGHT; CAT B, TO DIVERS CAUSED TO FALL AS A RESULT OF DAMAGE SUSTAINED FROM AA FIRE.









**LEGEND**

- CAT. B  
 - CAT. A

<b>TOTAL</b>	
CAT. A -	648
CAT. B -	<u>1535</u>
	2183



ANTWERP X AMMO EXPENDITURES  
1944-1945



# HEALTH

## OF THE COMMAND

A study of the weekly incidence in disease as indicated by admission rates for the IX Air Defense Command as compared with those of other commands within the Ninth Air Force for the 13 weeks period from 31 March 1945 to and including 29 June 1945 shows that IX Air Defense Command for an over all average was low. For the purpose of information and comparison, available statistics were obtained from the Office of the Chief Surgeon.

Table 1 is the comparative recapitulation of non-effective rates, and Table II is a summarization of the admission rates per week for the IX Air Defense Command. The admission rates for the period under consideration have been calculated on the basis of the number of new cases of illness and injury occurring among the one thousand (1000) personnel per annum. Those for the IX Air Defense Command were calculated from the information contained in the regular Medical Department reports submitted by Unit Surgeons within the Command, while the rates listed for ETOUSA and Ninth Air Force were taken from their own Statistical Reports.

Since personnel evacuated from unit dispensaries to other U.S. Army Medical Installations are immediately dropped from the medical re-

ports of the reporting organization, no days lost for those particular patients are calculated and are not reported to this Headquarters, consequently, the non-effective rates as listed in Table II are incomplete. However, since a comparable situation exists within all commands of the Ninth Air Force, the rates have, for the purpose of comparison, been recorded. It is pointed out that ultimately all such cases are charged against the responsible organization upon arrival of the information at the highest theater level.

On the basis of this study, it can be seen that the IX Air Defense Command has maintained its excellent standing from the standpoint of health of the personnel as compared with other commands in the report. This admission rate for all causes is the lowest of all reported; admissions due to disease only were the lowest of those reported; admission due to non-battle injuries constitute the lowest rate and this is true as well of the rates due to common respiratory disease, diarrhea, dysentery and venereal disease. Thus it may be seen that the excellent record as demonstrated in the two previous quarterly surveys have been maintained for a third quarter and considerable satisfaction may be derived from this fact.

## TABLE NO. I

### COMPARATIVE RECAPITULATION OF NONEFFECTIVE RATES

31 MARCH 1945 - 29 JUNE 1945

30 DECEMBER 1944 - 30 MARCH 1945

29 SEPTEMBER 1944 - 29 DECEMBER 1944

ORGANIZATION	(31 March -)	(30 Dec 44)	(29 Sept -)
	(29 June 45)	(30 Mar 45)	(29 Dec 44)
ETOUSA .....	Not Available	Not Available	Not Available
NINTH AIR FORCE .....	4.85	5.33	4.27
<hr/>			
IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND .....	.31	.64	.70
HQ. & HQ. SQ., NINTH AIR FORCE .....	2.62	3.84	3.50
IX AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND .....	1.53	2.58	1.89
9TH AIR DIVISION .....	3.31	4.39	4.07
IX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND .....	3.19	3.01	3.12
(+) XII TACTICAL AIR COMMAND .....	1.49	—	—
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND .....	1.57	2.19	2.35
XXIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND .....	2.02	3.39	3.28

#### Noneffective Rate:

The noneffective rate is the ratio of the duty days lost per thousand personnel during the period due to medical reasons, in relationship to the total number of duty days within the period. (See Letter)

(+) Covers period 1 June - 29 June 1945 only; totals for the two previous periods not available.

## TABLE NO. II

### SUMMARIZATION OF MEDICAL STATISTICS

of


### IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

31 MARCH 1945 — 29 JUNE 1945


(Average Weekly Admission Rate Per 1000 Personnel)

DATE	ALL CAUSES	DISEASE ONLY	NON-BATTLE INJURIES	CERTAIN DISEASES		
				COMMON RESPIRATORY	DIARRHEA and DYSENTERY	VENEREAL DISEASE
6 Apr 1945	6.59	5.55	0.83	1.38	0.0	0.71
13 " "	4.51	3.91	0.60	0.90	0.0	1.00
20 " "	8.15	6.50	1.65	1.77	0.0	0.47
27 " "	4.28	3.50	0.78	1.04	0.0	0.52
Average	5.88	4.92	0.96	1.27	0.0	0.67
4 May 1945	4.03	3.34	0.69	0.56	0.0	0.28
11 " "	7.57	6.54	1.03	0.17	0.0	1.55
18 " "	1.14	0.76	0.38	0.0	0.0	0.0
25 " "	3.35	3.20	0.15	0.30	0.0	0.46
Average	4.02	3.46	0.56	0.26	0.0	0.57
1 June 1945	10.48	9.82	0.66	1.33	0.0	1.86
8 " "	10.23	8.73	1.50	0.60	0.0	0.60
15 " "	4.47	4.22	0.25	0.25	0.0	0.25
22 " "	5.86	5.16	0.70	0.31	0.0	0.39
29 " "	8.30	7.44	0.86	0.57	0.0	1.24
JUNE	7.87	7.07	0.80	0.63	0.0	0.87
MAY	4.02	3.46	0.56	0.26	0.0	0.57
APRIL	5.88	4.92	0.96	1.27	0.0	0.67
Average FOR PERIOD	5.92	5.15	0.77	0.72	0.0	0.70

Compiled from information obtained from Weekly Medical Statistical Reports, Ninth Air Force.





MEDICAL ADMISSION RATES - IX A. D. C







# COMPARATIVE ADMISSION RATES



# Comparative Venereal Disease Rates






# DEATHS - IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND




# JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SECTION

## NINTH AIR FORCE DELINQUENCY RATE AVERAGE DEC. 1944 THRU APR. 1945




\* RATES EXPRESSED AS NUMBER OF DELINQUENCIES PER ANNUM PER 1000 INDIVIDUALS

**SUMMARY COURTS - MARTIAL - RATE PER 1000 PERSONS**



NOTE: HIGH JULY-SEPT. TREND RESULTS FROM TRIALS BY SUMMARY COURT 4 OF IX ADC WHILE ATTACHED TO FIRST ARMY.  
IX ADC TREND IS COMPARED TO THE AVERAGE TRENDS OF OTHER COMMANDS.


**SPECIAL COURTS - MARTIAL - RATE PER 1000 PERSONS**




NOTE: HIGH TREND WHEN COMPARED TO LOW GENERAL COURT TREND INDICATES ASSUMPTION OF DISCIPLINARY RESPONSIBILITY BY UNITS COMMANDERS IN APPROPRIATE CASES.




### GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL




### GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL



### ALL COURTS-MARTIAL



### MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS



# BATTLE of the BULGE

When the Germans launched their Ardennes offensive early in December, a number of units of the IX Air Defense Command then engaged in the defense of Antwerp against buzz bombs were detached to help meet this new threat. The 52d AAA Brigade, four group headquarters, twenty-one battalions, along with Ordnance and other service units were attached for operations to the Twelfth Army Group. These units were in action against the enemy mainly with the First Army. Their missions included anti-aircraft defenses of vital supply facilities, bridges, marshalling yards, anti-tank defenses, and Infantry missions. Some of the AAA battalions deployed along the MEUSE River were the 788th AAA AW Bn. on the eastern end at VERVIERS; the 113th and 126th AAA Gun Battalions, Battery "A", 863rd AAA AW Battalion and 784th and 451st AAA AW Battalions at LIEGE; the 52nd AAA Brigade, 204th AAA AW Battalion at HUY; the 184th AAA Gun Battalion and 787th AAA AW Battalions at NAMUR; and the 414th AAA Gun Battalion and 385th AAA AW Battalion at DINANT. All bridges along the MEUSE between DINANT and LIEGE were used by the First Army on its main supply routes.


On 26 December 1944 as the enemy neared DINANT the Luftwaffe increased their attacks to destroy the vital bridges on the MEUSE,

but were unsuccessful and many enemy planes were shot down. On 1 January 1945 the Luftwaffe made its last concerted strike into BELGIUM. Main supply route bridges, ammunition dumps and trains, and airfields were strafed, some planes being destroyed on the ground. The success of this attack was slight and many enemy aircraft were shot down. Upon the renewal of the counter offensive by the allies and the withdrawal of the enemy, most of the AAA Battalions were returned to operational control of the IX Air Defense Command in January and were redeployed in the defense of Antwerp against the buzz bomb attack.

An example of the ground role played by an AAA Battalion of the IX Air Defense Command in the Ardennes Campaign is that of the 863d AAA AW Battalion. This battalion was attached to the 99th Infantry Division in the Kalterherberg area. Enemy artillery fire was heavy. The Infantry took up positions around the AAA guns and preparations were made to repel the forthcoming attack. Two attacks were repulsed by the devastating fire of the combined forces. From 19 December to 31 December 1944 the battalion delivered long range plunging fire on German targets. Excellent results were observed and the enemy received heavy casualties.

# BATTLE OF THE BULGE

DEC. 1944 - JAN. 1945





## AA IN GROUND ROLES

In addition to the excellent work done by anti-aircraft in this theater in carrying out its primary mission, heavy and light anti-aircraft weapons and searchlights all commanded considerable respect in combatting the enemy on the ground.

During the siege of BREST 40mm and 90mm guns were employed as field artillery. The direct fire of the 40's of the 480th AAA AW Bn. was very valuable in knocking out point targets because of its great accuracy, while the indirect fire of the 90's of the 407th AAA Gun Bn. at ranges up to 15,000 yards, probably the first use by AA on the continent of this type of firing, brought forth much favorable comment from the Field Artillery Officers present.

During the Battle for the Ardennes, 40mm and 50 cal. AA weapons were used to play fire, direct and indirect, on main roads, intersections, bivouac areas, buildings and targets of

opportunity. The 863rd AAA AW Bn. distinguished itself in this type of work. (Covered under "Battle of the Bulge").

From 19 to 26 December, in the vicinity of Stoumont Station, the 143rd AAA Gun Bn., under almost constant enemy attack, was able to hold off a strong force supported by armor, and was credited with twelve enemy tanks.



The searchlights of the 2d platoon of Battery "B", 226th AAA Slt Bn., from 7 to 16 February 1945, were employed in direct support of front line troops. During this period they furnished illumination for night infantry attacks in the towns of FERSCHWEILER and ERNZEN; enabled the Engineers to work at night building bridges across the SAUER River in the vicinity of BALLENDORF; and provided airstrip illumination for Field Artillery observation planes operating at night.






60 inch reflector searchlight engaged in battle-field illumination role.


M-51 50 cal. quadruple machine gun being used as an anti-personnel weapon.




90mm AAA gun emplaced as an anti-tank weapon. High velocity projectile makes this gun effective against heavy armour.



This chart shows the number of messages handled each month from September 1944 to September 1945 inclusive. Includes incoming and outgoing messages at IX ADC Headquarters transmitted by radio, wire, and courier. Does not include normal military correspondence, distribution, etc. Total for the period was 33,458 messages.




This chart is based on chart No. 1, and shows how the volume of messages each month was transmitted. It is a percentage chart, the total traffic each month being 100%. The chart is very revealing, and it is easy to see how the tactical situation changed the use of the means of communication.




MULTIPLY BY 1,000  
TELEPHONE TRAFFIC

This chart shows the volume of telephone calls placed through the switchboard and dial system at IX ADC Headquarters. It includes all internal calls and both incoming and outgoing calls. Total for the period was 478,250.




CODE GROUPS EACH MONTH MULTIPLY BY 10,000  
CODED MESSAGES EACH MONTH MULTIPLY BY 100  
AVERAGE MESSAGE 112.0 CODED GROUPS

This chart shows the number of coded messages that were handled each month, both incoming and outgoing, and the number of code groups involved. The average number of code groups per message is based on the totals of 11,629 coded messages and 1,302,797 five-letter groups. The average is high, and indicates that considerable time is spent in encoding, transmitting, and decoding the average message.




This chart shows the proportion of the traffic shown in chart No. 1 that was transmitted by electrical means that had to be cryptographed. There is a direct relation between this chart and chart No. 2, showing how the use of teletype allowed more traffic to be sent in the clear.




This chart shows the number of radio nets in operation each fifteen days.






This chart shows how many HF and VHF radio sets were on hand each month in the IX ADC. Does not include SCR-593 which is only a receiver.



This chart shows the quantity of radar sets of all types that were operational in the hands of troops during the entire campaign in Northern Europe.




### WIRE CONSUMPTION




Shows by month the amount of field wire in miles that was consumed by all units of the command. Total for the period was 5,378 miles.

### COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR PERSONNEL



This chart shows the number of communications and radar personnel by specialty. It includes all units that were under the IX ADC on 1 February 1945. There is a total of 464 Signal Corps communications and radar specialists and 5,432 of other branches.



In destroying this V-1 the Black Widow flew through the blast, which burned away one-fourth of the plane surface, but the aircraft returned to base.

## NIGHT FIGHTER OPERATIONS

The 422nd and 425th Night Fighter Squadrons, assigned to IX Air Defense Command, operated P-61 "Black Widows" against flying bombs over the English Channel in July. At the same time, and until 7 October 1944 they flew "Night Patrol" missions over the continent.

21 Sector of 85 Group, British, operated two Night Fighter Squadrons equipped with Mosquito aircraft under control of this command from June until about 10 September 1944. Prior to 10 July 1944 these operations were carried out from bases in England.


Result of operations against flying bombs,  
(V-1s) for month of July were:

V-1s Destroyed	15
Sorties Flown	91
Hours of Operation	202
20mm Ammunition Expended	4,182 Rounds
Gasoline Consumed in Operations	30,700 Gallons

21 Sector, British, provided night patrol over the Beach Areas and Cherbourg Peninsula and later further east in the northern area of allied operations. Although enemy aircraft had to

fly over territory patrolled by other British night fighters, the Mosquitos of 21 Sector claimed 40 enemy aircraft destroyed and 8 damaged during operations from 13 July to 9 September 1944.

Black Widow operations from early August to 7 October were over the Peninsula south of CHERBOURG and from BREST eastward as far as LUXEMBOURG. One Squadron gave special attention to the PARIS area. During this period enemy activity over allied held territory at night was light.



60 inch reflector searchlight with an effective illumination range of greater than 15,000 yards. This light is the standard equipment for AAA Searchlight units.

# AAA SEARCHLIGHTS

During the operations prior to and after D-Day, the missions performed by AAA searchlight units have been many and varied. The two main assignments consisted of: (1) discovery and engagement of hostile aircraft, (2) assisting the allied air forces by means of homings, alerts and many other services.

Due to lack of enemy activity, searchlights were used very little in their primary role of illuminating hostile aircraft. However, much was done to aid friendly aircraft in finding their bases by night, and to aid them in landing. The figures compiled on these operations speak for themselves.



Total Homings	3,464
Planes Homed	10,421
Personnel (Crew members)	38,500


What do these figures prove?

To quote Lt. Col. Aris B. Johnson, Commanding Officer, 422nd Night fighter Squadron, "It is believed that the squadron operations would have been cut down at least 25% without the searchlights." In later official statements, Lt. Col. Johnson revised his estimate upward, stating that his combat efficiency would be decreased 50% without the lights. And here are methods used by the men of the searchlight battalions in attaining such respect.

**AAA Operations Room in action at airfield A-71. Plotters at left are recording plots being telephoned in from the data readers on the radars.**







## CANOPY

Of all the types of assistance which searchlights were able to offer the Air Forces, the most called for and most important was the canopy. The standard deployment for lights in this form of assistance is such that four (4) lights are situated in an approximate square around the airstrip. All light sections are given previously prepared azimuth and angle charts which permit them to form an intersection over the center of the airstrip. If the plane is coming in under the clouds the lights are then clearly

visible, while if he is flying above the clouds the intersection on the cloud base will create a glow above the base which can be seen at a distance of approximately fifteen (15) miles.

An example of this type assistance occurred near airstrip A-58 on the night of 24 September 1944, when Section 4 of the First Platoon, Battery "A", 225th AAA Searchlight Battalion picked up an aircraft showing no signs of being friend or foe. Upon illumination the plane proved to be a C-47 which immediately flashed


an SOS. A canopy was formed and the plane landed safely. Lt. Potter the pilot, called the members of the searchlight section and personally thanked them because as he stated: "I


was completely lost and had only 30 minutes fuel supply left". This and many more examples prove the searchlights are here to stay.

## HOMING ON ADVACENT AIRSTRIPS

A less frequently used method of homing but one which has been found invaluable in emergencies is homing on adjacent airstrips. When lights are deployed on objectives other than airstrips, light sections were furnished azimuths of all fields on which planes in distress in that area might be expected to land. Once a canopy has been formed over a designated airstrip, one

beam was exposed as nearly horizontal as possible in the direction of the desired airstrip for a period of thirty (30) seconds. In order to catch the pilot's eye, the beam was then elevated to forty-five (45) degrees and depressed three (3) times quickly without being extinguished. This method has been used on approximately twenty-five (25) occasions.





## BEACONS


In forward areas, when there had been any indication that hostile aircraft were operating in the vicinity, it was found inadvisable to pinpoint the airstrip by forming a canopy. In such cases, when homing assistance was needed, either one or both of the searchlights which under normal conditions are placed at the ends of the runways, are exposed vertically as bea-

cons. Under extremely unfavorable weather conditions, waving beacons were employed so as to seek out thin spots in the clouds where they could break through and attract the attention of the pilot. This method was found to be satisfactory under most conditions and has been used as a homing aid more than any other method except the canopy.


## DAY LIGHT HOMING

The methods previously mentioned hold true for day-light time and differ only in the colors of the beams. This is accomplished by inserting colored filters over the face of the searchlight. An amber wobble beacon attracts the fliers attention while green beacons designate the ends of the runways. Any combination of colors may be used but from experience amber, yellows

and green have proven successful many times when haze, fog and low clouds had obscured the runways to pilots returning from operational missions. Use of red, amber, and green beacons on snow covered landscape proved highly effective in assisting pilots to land on the airstrip.







## BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION

A less widely known use of AAA Searchlights is for battlefield illumination. Throughout the major portion of the campaign on the continent the batteries of the 226th AAA SLT Bn. assigned to this command were in turn attached to Twelfth Army Group for this purpose. They worked with forward infantry elements and illuminated the area over which a


night attack was to take place. Surprise and deception were obtained by the use of searchlights and infantry troops once accustomed to them became ardent supporters of their use. Infantry commanders who at first demanded that the lights be put out, soon came to want them on all night long.



## MISCELLANEOUS USES

Searchlights were effectively employed to measure by triangulation the height of the cloud base above the earth. They were also used frequently to illuminate the airstrip, to provide lighting for emergency rescue and repair work

on or near airdromes. They have strengthened air base security during darkness by being put in action intermittently and sweeping over the airdrome area.





# WEATHER

Before the invasion of the European Continent, artillery meteorological messages were obtained by traditional AAA methods. Winds aloft were computed from PIBALS: densities were obtained from tables in TM4-240 based on a standard relationship between surface and upper air temperatures, pressure and humidities. These methods proved wholly inadequate when poor visibility and low clouds obscured the flight of balloons and when upper air densities varies from the standard conditions that were assumed. At the same time, the Weather Service was faced with the problem of obtaining winds aloft in a theater of operations where the ordinary PIBAL methods would yield, at best, data at irregular intervals and to limited heights. The need of Artillery and Weather Service units was solved by the initiation of an Artillery Weather Program where-in the excellent equipment of the two different branches

—AAA's Radar and Weather's Radiosonde— were utilized to the best advantage.

The results of the actual splendid cooperation between the two branches during this War is forcefully illustrated in the deadly accuracy of the gunners in defending the port of Antwerp against the V-1 flying bomb. Due to the increased difficulties involved in shooting down a V-1, in comparison with shooting down an airplane, extremely accurate upper air data was a prime requisite in overcoming these difficulties. The flight of a shell after it leaves a gun is affected by many meteorological factors all of which must be made known to the gunner so that he can apply the proper corrections. During the war, these factors were made known to the gunner by a quick efficient interchange of data between the Weather Service and the Artillery Corps.






## FORMER METHODS OF OBTAINING UPPER AIR DATA WERE INADEQUATE

The speed and direction of upper winds can now be obtained accurately by use of Radar under practically all weather conditions.

The accuracy and efficiency of the Radiosonde is not affected by the usual weather conditions, so that accurate densities are possible at all times.



## ACCURATE METEOROLOGICAL MESSAGES WERE ESPECIALLY NECESSARY IN COMBATTING THE V-1

To destroy the average V-1, the shell must explode within about 10 yards of the target.

An error of 10 miles per hour in computing the velocity of a crosswind would have caused the shell to miss the average V-1 in flight toward Antwerp by approximately 17 yards.

# METROLOGICAL FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THE FLIGHT OF A SHELL

Shell A will be retarded due to the cold dense air.

Shell B will be retarded due to the cold dense air and also the thick cloud formations even though the shell does enter into warm less dense air.

Shell C will have its trajectory entirely in warm, clear, moist air; therefore, it will have less retarding forces than the other trajectories. However, if the air is warm, clear and dry, the air will be more dense and consequently retard the shell.

Shell D will be retarded by the long distance it travels in the thick, turbulent clouds.


Shell E will be retarded by the long distance it travels through heavy precipitation as well as the cooler more dense air.

The necessity of accurate wind data can be realized by noting the usual change in wind di-

rection as shown along each shell's trajectory. It is especially important that accurate wind speed and direction be known in cases of trajectories "B" and "E" where large changes in wind occur. Note - Wind direction as shown is on a horizontal compass plane; not on a vertical plane.

If a radiosonde were to ascend along trajectory "C", the density of the air would be found to be very near to the standard density of air.

If a radiosonde were to ascend along trajectory "B", two distinct layers of air, each with densities differing from the standard density of air, would be found. Under some weather conditions three or more distinct layers can be found. With a radiosonde this information is accurately obtained.





# SUPPLY

The supply mission of the IX Air Defense Command has been to assure all types of supply to Antiaircraft Artillery, Night Fighter, Signal Air Warning, and Ordnance Maintenance Units. This requirement had to be met without benefit of depots under command control.

Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, attempted in the beginning to assume responsibility for all types of supply except items peculiar to Antiaircraft Artillery Units, but were never able to meet such an obligation. This was due partly through a shortage of service troops within the air force and partly to continuous movement of their existing air force service units; such movements delayed the processing of AAA requisitions in that with each movement an AAA unit would have to resubmit their requisitions. Such a supply system was wholly unsatisfactory and ultimately resulted in the recognition of the IX Air Defense Command as a major command for supply, receiving allocations of equipment directly from Headquarters, Communications Zone. Units located within an Army Area received expendables from Army Depots; units behind enemy rear area lines used Base Section Depots.

Experience in this command has indicated a need for the following service troops in order to be able to meet supply and maintenance re-

quirements of a command of similar size and composition:


1. One - Depot Company - for Class II, III and IV items.
2. One - Ammunition Company - for class V in special cases.
3. One - QM Truck Company - for major supply hauls.
4. One - Ordnance Maintenance Co. (AA) - for each five AAA Battalions.
5. One - Ordnance Battalion Headquarters - for each four Ordnance Maintenance Companies.


It is believed that the supply mission of an Air Defense Command can be met satisfactorily if such Command:

1. Can receive direct allocations of all major items, equipment to be issued through existing Communication Zone Depots.
2. Keeps Base Sections and Armies notified at all times of Air Defense Command units, in their respective areas, for whom Class I and other expendables will be required.
3. Has the troops listed in III above to supplement normal depot establishments where peculiar and emergency situations arise.

# STRENGTH IN ARTILLERY

## 1944 - 1945





# ORDNANCE

The Ordnance Section was busy from activation until D-Day establishing policy, making contacts and assisting in bringing units up to a fully equipped status. The IX Air Defense Command's steady growth and increasing activities on the beach presented many complex and intricate Ordnance problems in supply and maintenance. These were caused mainly by the lack of any assigned Ordnance units and the uniqueness of the Command.

In September 1944, the 311th Ordnance Battalion and the following seven (7) Ordnance Maintenance Companies (AA) were attached to the Command: 272nd, 274th, 276th, 278th, 280th, 298th, and the 354th. Despite the wide dispersion of units of the Command skilled Ordnance service was always made quickly available by the company shops, numerous detachments operating small semi-permanent shops, and daily contact parties from all companies and detachments.

With November came the defense of ANTWERP which increased the activity and rounds fired many fold. To assist in the ammunition supply problem the 3056th Ordnance Service Composite Company was obtained and placed in the ANTWERP area. The 3056th was augmented by approximately one hundred and fifty (150) civilian laborers to enable it to handle the fabulous quantities of ammunition required.

In December the 318th Ordnance Battalion and the 368th Ordnance Maintenance Company (AA) were attached. By the first part of January and continuing through March, the Ordnance situation was essentially as represented by accompanying chart. During this time Ordnance maintenance and supply facilities were

strained to the utmost due to the extremely high continuous activity of the ANTWERP X Command and the "Battle of the Bulge". The over-taxed M7 Generators were failing in alarming numbers. 90mm gun tubes became unserviceable and were changed by the dozens, a total of over two-hundred (200) being changed in this period. Pawls for the 90mm fuze setters M13 were wearing out and causing gross inaccuracy in firing. Enemy action, lengthening supply lines (PARIS, CHERBOURG, and ROUEN for many Ordnance items); heavy requirements of ammunition, mud and snow, war torn roads, and frequent unit moves subjected all automotive equipment to unmerciful and relentless beatings. The Ordnance units by persistence and ingenuity rose to the situation. When parts were difficult to obtain (such as for M7 Generators and fuze setters) they were repaired by new techniques, improvised, obtained by local purchase, or all of these failing, the entire major item was replaced. Special equipment and tools in excess of T/E were obtained to enable the Ordnance companies to keep abreast of the maintenance demands. The job was accomplished and the guns continued to fire.










As the offensive crossed the Rhine and thereafter the Ordnance units were quickly relocated to continue furnishing close-in support. After V-E Day the work continued in the form of disarmament and increased automotive maintenance. The magnitude of the Ordnance mission is well illustrated by the comparative chart which shows that IX ADC had more Ordnance equipment than a Corps composed of three (3) Infantry Divisions and a Corps Headquarters.





# Comparison of Order of Battle

## 9 Air Def. Com'd (strength as of Feb. 1945)

	VEHICLES
9 <sup>th</sup> ADC	
CORPS	
	SMALL ARMS
9 <sup>th</sup> ADC	
CORPS	
	ARTILLERY
9 <sup>th</sup> ADC	
CORPS	
	FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT
9 <sup>th</sup> ADC	
CORPS	
	FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT (SPECIAL)
9 <sup>th</sup> ADC	
CORPS	



# Finance Equipment ween



## Corps (strength of three Inf. Div. plus Corps Hq)

	<p>= 1000</p>	<p>general &amp; special purpose, combat vehicles and trailers (does not include M-7 generators &amp; trailers and M-51 multiple mount trailers of which 9" ADC has 1,168 &amp; Corps-0)</p>	7,360
			6,611
	<p>10,000</p>	<p>all caliber up to and including 50 caliber M.G.</p>	50,653
			51,176
	<p>= 200</p>	<p>40 &amp; 90MM guns</p>	1,216
	<p>= 200</p>	<p>37, 57MM &amp; 155MM howitzers, 60 &amp; 81 mortars</p>	801
	<p>= 1,500</p>	<p>watches, binoculars, telescopes, height &amp; range finders, aiming circles &amp; BC scopes</p>	8,320
	<p>= 500</p>	<p>M-5 &amp; M-7 generators, fuse setters, directors &amp; computing sights</p>	7,221
			3,214 0



Destroyed enemy aircraft being examined by AAA personnel

## NEW YEAR'S DAY RAIDS

Since well before D-Day, Allied fighter-bomber operations had steadily increased in intensity to the point of being a decisive factor in tactical warfare. It was not unnatural, therefore, that repeated, if sporadic, German attempts should be made to neutralize the Allied fighter-bombers. On 1 January 1945, the enemy's concern with the effect of our air activity against his ground forces was shown by a major all-out effort against our airfields. The enormous German effort is seen to have been a brilliantly planned, but not so brilliantly executed, attempt to cripple the Allied Tactical Air Force. Further it was countered by a well prepared and efficient air defense force.

In all, over 800 German planes took part in these raids, although not all of them reached the Allied airfields. Long range intelligence provided no specific advance warning of this particular operation, nevertheless, it was the battle

which the IX Air Defense Command had long predicted would come, and for which we had trained and prepared in spite of obstacles and opposition. The carefully built up teams of fighters, Antiaircraft Artillery, and signal air warning units functioned with efficiency and outstanding success. Instead of dealing a mortal blow to the Ninth Air Force, the Luftwaffe took a beating from which it never recovered. Losses and damage on the American airfields were negligible, whereas, GAF losses were enormous. Air Force claims (including claims by Eighth Air Force fighters attached to the Ninth Air Force) were 160 enemy aircraft destroyed; AAA claims (including claims by AAA units attached to the armies) were 300 enemy aircraft.

A typical example of the type of air defense success achieved is the action at Y-29, an airfield of the XXIX Tactical Air Command located at ASCH, Belgium. The perfect coordina-

tion achieved by the air and the AAA units defending the field resulted in only 9 of the 50 plus, attacking enemy aircraft escaping destruction.

At 0900, 1 January, a radio warning was received in the Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Room that a large group of enemy aircraft was heading in the direction of Y-29. From the plot it was seen that the hostiles were approximately five minutes flying time from the field. The duty officer at the AAOR immediately notified the airfield commander. Next a warning was flashed by the AA OP's situated in a ring from three to five miles from the field. This warning reached the AAOR and the gun sections two minutes before the enemy planes came over the field. At this particular time, two of the squadrons stationed at Y-29 were in the vicinity of ASCH returning from missions. These fighters were notified of the hostiles, and directed to intercept.

During the ensuing action, some of the fighters ran out of both ammunition and gasoline


necessitating their landing to rearm and refuel. On several occasions, enemy aircraft dove on and strafed the landing fighters. AAA gunners engaged the enemy directly behind the landing "friendly", and either drove off or shot down the enemy aircraft. In some cases AAA fire broke up formations of enemy fighters attacking our planes, while in other cases the tracers of the AAA gunfire pointed out low flying enemy aircraft identifying them for our fighters. A careful investigation revealed that in no case did the AAA engage a friendly fighter. No fire control or direction was attempted from the AAOR. After the action, the Air Force Comamnder of Y-29 was asked if he considered a "hold fire" order would have given greater freedom to his planes. He replied that a "hold fire" was not necessary for he had complete faith in the ability and skill of the AAA defending his field. This action illustrates the coordination which can be achieved by an integrated air defense.

**A tail-feather of the GAF**





## IX ADC ROLE DURING ENEMY RAIDS OF 1 JAN 1945



★ CONFUSED CONDITIONS AND JOINT AIR & AA ACTION RESULTED IN DUPLICATION OF CLAIMS AND MISESTIMATION OF ATTACKERS, BUT IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT IN BOTH BRITISH AND AMERICAN SECTORS ONLY 397 E/A WERE REPORTED ATTACKING OF AN ESTIMATED 800 WHICH PARTICIPATED.

84 ENEMY AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE AMERICAN SECTOR AND 36 OF THEM WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. THEY DESTROYED OR DAMAGED 69 FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT.

# IX ADC TRUCK COMPANIES

In the fall of 1944 it became obvious that the supplies needed by the armies could not be moved forward fast enough with the transportation then available. To meet this emergency the Supreme Commander directed that all available trucks in the theater be formed into provisional truck companies. Ten truck companies, consisting of fifty trucks each, were organized by this command and attached to the Normandy Base Section.

The loss of five hundred trucks greatly hampered the forward movement of antiaircraft units. To use the remaining trucks in the most efficient manner, they were formed into truck companies which were used under direct control of Headquarters, IX, ADC, to move subordinate units.

Three truck companies, one with 48 trucks and two with 41 trucks each, were formed and based near the command Headquarters in VERSAILLES. Whenever it was necessary to move a unit to a new position these trucks were called

on. The demand for these trucks was heavy and constant. Although all trucks were being used steadily throughout the emergency, the hard work of the personnel involved kept them on the road and enabled the command to fulfill its responsibilities of furnishing antiaircraft protection for the Ninth Air Force installations and the Communications Zone.

In the spring of 1945 it became necessary once more to furnish trucks, this time to the IX Air Force Service Command. The war progressed so rapidly that it became obvious that the work then being done to prepare airfields to give close support to the advancing armies would have to be greatly accelerated. To speed up the work, more trucks were needed. This command was called on to furnish two truck companies of fifty trucks each. The companies were formed and sent to Service Command in the middle of April. These two companies worked constantly until the twelfth of July when they were disbanded.



## CHAPLAIN SECTION


The Chaplain Section was organized on 4 March, 1944, and was composed of the Chaplain (Major) and one enlisted man. The Section increased in size with the growth of the Command until in February, when fifty-four Chaplains were serving the units, the section consisted of the supervisory Chaplain and assist-

ant, a chief clerk and two assistant clerks.

The following are the purposes and duties of the Chaplain Section:

1. Advisor to the Commander and Staff in religious and moral activities of the command.





**Chaplain conference at Paris**

2. Supervision of the spiritual welfare of the Command.
3. Conduct of religious service, including funerals.
4. Spiritual ministrations to the sick and wounded.
5. Correspondence with relatives of deceased personnel.
6. Coordination of the religious work of the various welfare societies.
7. Supervision and coordination, within limits prescribed by the Commander, of the training and work of the Chaplains of subordinate units.
8. Recommendations as to assignments and transfers of Chaplains.
9. Providing the services of Chaplains for units requiring them.

10. Preparation of reports relative to the religious and moral activities of the Command.

The IX Air Defense Command Chaplain's story is a unique one. The 54 Chaplains served an equivalent of nearly three Infantry divisions under the supervision of one Command Chaplain and an assistant chaplain. During the winter of 1944-45 units of the Command were stationed the length and breadth of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, western Germany and southern Holland.

Figures are tiresome but they do portray in a measure the interest of the soldier in his spiritual welfare and the effectiveness of the Chaplain's mission. In one month 54 chaplains conducted 1,806 services with an attendance of 44,368. They made 36,138 personal contacts and distributed 14,799 items of religious supplies. Seven chaplains have been awarded the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious service.

# CHAMONIX REST CENTER

With the termination of hostilities in the theatre, the need of a separate rest area for members of the IX Air Defense Command became apparent. To this end the Commanding General selected and caused to be established the IX Air Defense Command Rest Center at CHAMONIX, France. Located at the foot of Mont Blanc in the French Alps in an all-year round resort town, it was ideally suited as a playground and recreation spot.

Opening on 1 June 1945, its operation was turned over to the 118th AAA Group, commanded by Colonel James T. Campbell. Fourteen hotels with a total capacity of 1250 persons were requisitioned, two of which being allocated for the use of Officers. Troops, fresh from field positions throughout Germany, were provided with clean sheets, excellent French cooking, a minimum of military restrictions, and a wide variety of sports and amusements. Easily accessible to all were mountain climbing, excursions by cable cars into the mountains, swimming, tennis, golf, motor sightseeing trips to Lake Geneva, Lake Annecy, and the Swiss frontier, and

just plain loafing under the most desirable conditions. Personnel were transported to the rest center by IX Air Defense Command aircraft or by motor convoy, but regardless of the time required to make the trip each man was assured seven days at Chamonix. Because of its beautiful surroundings and elaborate entertainment facilities, the men who visited it will long regard their stay there as unique among their overseas experiences.

The rest center closed on 26 September 1945 after four months of successful operation, having accommodated a weekly average of 40 Officers and 1000 EM. It was estimated that more than half of the Command attended it during its existence. In addition to the Chamonix rest center, the IX Air Defense Command sponsored and encouraged numerous other rest centers maintained independently by its battalions, groups, and brigades.

Broad in its conception, unique in location, and efficiently administered, the Chamonix project served an entirely worthwhile and practical purpose within the Command.





# INFORMATION

The Army Information-Education Program included as principle divisions: (a) conducting research into matters affecting morale, (b) disseminating information to military personnel, (c) providing educational opportunities for troops, and (d) orienting military personnel in the war and other current events. Beginning in October 1944, when a separate Information-Education sub-section was created at IX Air Defense Command Headquarters, this program was put into effect by I-E personnel in all echelons. A summary of the performance of this program can be divided into two phases, during hostilities and after hostilities.

Between October 1944 and V-E day the training of I-E personnel, forming effective I-E sections down to battalion level, disseminating information was apparent. Aggregate monthly attendance at orientation discussion groups averaged 50,708 troops for the period from January to May 1945. More than 800 information bulletin boards were maintained, along with over fifty (50) information centers. The number of students participating in the United States Armed Forces Institute correspondence course program averaged 1622. More than ten thousand troops a month attended orientation lectures, forums or debates. Over three hundred

**Orientation is an important aspect of the Information-Education program**



## & EDUCATION



(300) Hobby Shops were established and many tours to points of interest were conducted during the months of hostilities.

Following V-E day the tempo of I-E activities increased to provide orientation for troops in the new problems arising from changes in formation, and the orienting of troops about the war were the main activities. Officers to fill information-education and instructor training posts were trained at the 6819th Army Information-Education Staff School in PARIS. On 16 - 17 April 1945, a course for brigade On-the-Job-Training Officers was given at Command Headquarters.

In the units under the Command considerable progress toward fulfilling the aims of the pro-

their duties and to furnish worthwhile occupation for time no longer demanded by military pursuits. The educational features of the I-E program received increased emphasis. By making educational surveys, collecting supplies, and training instructors, many units prepared for the opening of organizational schools. Despite the problems of movement, guard duty, dispersion of units, and lack of books, fifteen (15) battalions in the Command by the end of June were operating schools enrolling 2050 men. This number increased to twenty-three (23) battalions and 2405 men in August.

At Command Headquarters a centralized school system has developed during the months of July, August, and September. These schools

**A technical subject being taught in the Centralized School.**





included a technical institute offering courses in automechanics, mechanical drawing, welding, basic electricity, watch repair; schools in commercial art and dramatic arts; and schools in poultry production and horse production. Over 250 soldiers benefited from the opportunity to attend these schools.


Meanwhile quotas to theater level schools were received and more than 600 students from the Command attended Biarritz or Shrivenham American Universities, Walton Technical

School, or various civilian schools in France and England.

A feature of the I-E post-hostilities program was formed around the trips to points of particular interest. While favorably located, several thousand troops enjoyed a tourist's view of Europe's scenery.


The charts and graphs accompanying this summary of I-E program in the IX Air Defense Command aid in presenting the scope of the I-E activities during the past months.

**Drafting and reproduction section of the Command's I and E school**







### ORIENTATION DISCUSSION GROUPS




### LECTURES FORUMS, DEBATES




### USAFI CORRESPONDENCE COURSE ENROLLMENT




### ATTENDANCE AT THEATER LEVEL SCHOOLS



## EDUCATIONAL TOURS



## UNIT SCHOOL ENROLLMENT





Cast of all-soldier musical show "Odds N Ends" produced by the 568th AAA AW Bn. and sponsored by Command Special Service Section.

## SPECIAL SERVICE

On the day the Command was activated, the Special Service Section started functioning with one officer and two enlisted men. As the Command grew in size, the Special Service Section expanded, until it became fully departmentalized in December of 1944 with entertainment, athletic, supply, movie, and administrative subdivisions, each with an officer in charge, with a total section strength of fifteen. The section's principal function was to plan, organize, and coordinate the special service activities among the units of the Command.



# ENTERTAINMENT

Activity in the entertainment field fell into two parts: that of procuring and routing "live shows" for the subordinate units, and that of organizing and producing theatrical productions from among personnel within the Command. Outstanding among the latter was the musical variety show, "The Air Defenders", which began rehearsal in February of 1945 and later completed a tour of the Command. The 568th AAA AW Battalion produced a variety show entitled "Odds N Ends" which became one of the finest unit soldier productions in the Theatre. It was eventually absorbed by the 4th Special Service Company, but also completed an extensive tour of the Command. Combining professional and amateur talent, the entertainment section built a show around a group of


Danish entertainers flown to the Command from COPENHAGEN for this particular purpose. This production, called "Copenhagen Capers", toured the Command for two weeks. In order to stimulate amateur theatrics at battalion level, a talent team was formed, and sent to several units to provide professional advice and instruction.

After arrival in Germany, the Entertainment Officer was named Area Representative for Live Shows in the Schweinfurt area. He held this assignment from May to September of 1945, and became responsible for billeting and routing all USO shows within the area. Such performers as Bob Hope, Paul Robeson, and the Lunts were brought before the units of the Command.

**Paul Robeson singing in IX ADC theatre at Bad Neustadt.**



**Danish performers in IX ADC's "Copenhagen Capers" show. Outdoor theatre at Bad Neustadt.**







Swimming meet at Bad Neustadt.

## ATHLETICS

The first major athletic undertaking of the Special Service Section was the organization of an all-star Command football team. This team played a satisfactory season in 1944 with three wins, two defeats, and one scoreless tie. Plans for reorganizing this team for the 1945 season were curtailed by redeployment. A Command basketball tournament was held in Paris during February of 1945, followed by a volleyball tournament in April. Winners in the brigade eliminations competed with Command Head-

quarters teams for the championships. The ice hockey team of the 407th AAA Gun Battalion was brought to Paris to compete against French civilian and Communication Zone teams. On several occasions, boxers were brought to Paris to participate in prize fights sponsored by the American Red Cross. One heavy-weight boxer from the Command defeated the French Heavy-weight Champion.

The Command athletic program, however, reached full stride in Germany during the summer of 1945. Eight major tournaments were held; two softball competitions, a baseball tournament, a tennis tournament, a swimming meet, a track and field meet, a golf match, and archery and horse-shoe tournaments. The winners of the Command competitions competed in the Ninth Air Force championships, and outstanding individuals were later selected to participate in theatre level championships.

At various times during 1945, quotas were received to send personnel to the Ninth Air Force Umpire School, Football Clinic, Boxing Clinic, Basketball Clinic, and to the Theatre Ski School. A full development of the Command's program was restricted by accelerated redeployment. The five-team Command football league was suspended for this reason in September of 1945.

The dance orchestra of the 795th AAA AW Bn. one of the six trained by the IX ADC.



# SUPPLY


Athletic supplies and sporting equipment was received from Communications Zone through the Ninth Air Force and distributed to battalion level by the Special Service supply section through brigades and groups. The post V-E Day athletic requirement needs of the Command were adequately met, and all of its subordinate units were issued excellent equipment in sufficient quantity. As a result of extensive effort

on the part of the Special Service Officer, motion picture projectors were obtained from all brigades and battalions within the Command. Three films were drawn from Ninth Air Force weekly, and routed throughout the Command. With the advent of full scale redeployment, supply emphasis was placed on Category I units, all of whom were completely supplied with all types of athletic and special service equipment.


**Bob Hope, Jerry Calone, and cast of USO show pictured in Enlisted Mens' Club at Command Headquarters after performance.**




### MOVIE ATTENDANCE




### LIVE SHOW ATTENDANCE



### ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION




### DANCE ATTENDANCE



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